




terland	 und	 Kolonie.	 Dieser	 Aufsatz	 beleuchtet	 zunächst	 die	 geopolitischen	 und	 kulturellen	
Voraussetzungen	dafür,	dass	die	portugiesische	politische	Elite	mit	relativer	Leichtigkeit	ihren	






When Napoleon charged across Europe, he put in motion vast changes in the political, 
social and economic order. During the Napoleonic wars (1792–1815), a period that is 
often described as a “time of global crisis,” states and empires were radically altered and 
new borders were drawn.1 However, not all European countries completely changed geo-
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its throne from Napoleonic usurpation (unlike its larger neighbor, Spain) but also kept 
together its multi-continental empire. How did the Portuguese resist these revolution-
ary changes? The answer lies – at least in part – in the willingness to create a “possible 
Europe” beyond the actual borders of Europe.
On the face of it, the situation seemed hopeless. Traditionally allied with Great Britain, 
Portugal ran into mischief as Napoleon Bonaparte intended to implement the “Con-
tinental Blockade” (November 21st, 1806) as his supreme weapon against his greatest 
enemy.2 The Portuguese government could neither choose between British and French 
demands, nor could they resist them. As the summer and fall of 1807 wore on, “Portugal 
[got] caught like a shellfish in a tempest between the waves of England’s sea power and 
the rock of Napoleon’s armies,” as Alan K. Manchester put it.3 When French troops 
under the command of General Andoche Junot marched against Lisbon in order to take 
over the Portuguese Crown in November 1807, the Portuguese Prince Regent, D. João, 
undertook the remarkable venture of transferring the entire Royal Court from Lisbon 
to Rio de Janeiro. He took with him all of the state paraphernalia, the archives and the 
treasure, as well as the ministers of government and a large part of the ruling classes. All 
in all, some 15,000 people accompanied the monarch. In short, he transferred all that 
was needed for the creation of a new capital in the New World.4 For the first and only 
time, a European colonial power moved its seat of government and thus its capital to a 
distant, peripheral territory. This solution to the “Napoleonic Problem” was, without any 
doubt, an extremely innovative one. It is commonly argued that the transfer of the seat of 
government equaled an inversion of the colonial relation: after 1808, Brazil turned into 
the center of the empire and Portugal was now its colony5 or, as some contemporaries 
lamented, a “colony of the colony.” 6
What is surprising at first glance is the willingness of the Portuguese Crown and the elites 
to leave Europe behind. In the face of the Napoleonic threat, their European roots and 
cultural ties seemed to not have held them back. Where does this remarkable disposition 
come from? In the first section of this paper, I shall explain the preconditions that made 
the transfer of the Portuguese court possible. More precisely, I propose to deal with the 















34 | Debora Gerstenberger
European part of the empire as its “weak spot.” Leaving Europe behind, however, did not 
mean abandoning European ideals and norms. In fact, conceptions and ideals of Euro-
pean civilization and society played a crucial role in the construction of the new Portu-
guese capital in Brazil as soon as the monarch’s fleet arrived. Therefore, the second part 
of this paper will focus on the concrete measures undertaken by the authorities in order 
to construct an “adequate” center of the empire in the (former) colony. Some historians 
argue that following the court’s arrival, Rio de Janeiro was subject to a “Europeanization” 
or even “Re-Europeanization”7 and that the project of establishing the Portuguese capital 
in the tropics also entailed the construction of an (alternative) “possible Europe.”8 But 
what did “Europeanization” actually mean and how would it be achieved? The measures 
undertaken by the authorities were, as shall be argued in the second part, by no means 
always coherent or without contradictions but rather were characterized by conflicting 
tendencies. In any case, they were also characterized by the partial adaptation – but also 
rejection – of what was conceived as European.
1. The European mother country as the weak spot of the Portuguese Empire
The transfer of the Court in 1807 / 1808 cannot be analyzed without considering the 
structure of the Portuguese seaborne empire and especially the geopolitical outlook that 
developed out of the voyages of discovery since the fifteenth century. The Portuguese 
empire was the earliest and the longest-lived of the modern European colonial empires, 
spanning almost six centuries from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to the handover of 
Macau in 1999. Despite ruling over territories in all parts of the world, the mother coun-
try itself has always been vulnerable: The small territory of Portugal at the edge of Europe 
has at all times been threatened by the more powerful neighbor Castile (later Spain) and 
was therefore considered weak and rather insufficient by the Portuguese themselves. 
In fact, the idea of moving the Portuguese capital to the New World of America in order 
to achieve a better geopolitical foothold arose beginning in the late sixteenth century 
when Portugal was annexed by Castile (the Iberian “Union” lasted sixty years from 1580 
to 1640). Since then, clerics and politicians repeatedly recommended the establishment 
of the capital of the Portuguese Empire in the New World.9 In the seventeenth century, 
Jesuit António Vieira (1608–1697) promoted the image of Brazil as the biblical “Fifth 
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would be capable of renewing and strengthening the whole empire. In the eighteenth 
century, with the findings of gold and diamonds, the colony of Brazil definitely turned 
into the most important part of the Portuguese emprire: the “crown jewel.” The diplomat 
Luís da Cunha (1696–1749) advised King João V (father of João VI) that it was time to 
take “people of both sexes” to the “well-populated continent of Brazil” where he would 
achieve the title of “Emperor of the West.” In da Cunhas’ opinion, the most suitable 
place for the king’s residence was the city of Rio de Janeiro, which would soon become 
more opulent than Lisbon. According to him, Portugal was the “weak spot” of the Portu-
guese empire: the mother country could not survive without Brazil, whereas Brazil could 
survive perfectly well without Portugal.11 After the great earthquake of 1755, which 
destroyed Lisbon and killed up to 100,000 people, the “almighty” minister Marquês de 
Pombal (1750–1782) also gave serious thought to a new capital in America.12 
The Portuguese historian A. H. Oliveira Marques summarized the importance of the 
American colony to the European mother country by explaining that from the late sev-
enteenth century until 1822 (the year of Brazilian independence), Brazil was not only 
the centerpiece of the Portuguese colonial empire, but in fact the “essence of Portugal it-
self.”13 On the economic level, it can be argued that Portugal indeed was a “monocolonial 
empire.”14 Much of the state income depended on its possessions in America.15
In the face of the “international convulsions” in the early nineteenth century16, the idea 
of moving the Portuguese capital to the New World of America was not only based on 
economic principles, but also, in large part, driven by geopolitical considerations.17 The 
Portuguese diplomat in Berlin, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, advised Prince Regent João in 
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of Napoleon was about to destroy the old European dynasties.18 In the same year, Rod-
rigo de Souza Coutinho, one of João’s most influential ministers, stated that considering 
the precarious situation in Europe, the “only chance” the sovereign and his people had 
would be to transfer the seat of government to the vast and rich Brazil. From there, one 
could establish a “powerful empire” (poderozo Imperio) from which territories lost in Eu-
rope could easily be recaptured.19 The basic argument used by him and other politicians 
was that the transfer of the court would be capable of renewing and strengthening the 
empire as a whole and thus – at least in theory –also contribute to a better situation for 
the Portuguese in Europe.20 
To be sure, the transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court was a “dramatic and extraordi-
nary” answer to the global crisis.21 As the Napoleonic invasion provided the impetus to 
put into action the old plan of transferring the seat of government to Brazil, the transfer 
is a perfect example, firstly, of global crises setting free energy for innovative spatial con-
cepts,22 and secondly of innovative spatial concepts emerging smoothly from tradition. 
The venture would not have been possible if members of the Portuguese political elites 
had not repeatedly stated that leaving the cradle of the monarchy behind and transfer-
ring the seat of government to the rich New World would be an appropriate measure to 
create a “vast and powerful” empire.23 This “utopia” was deeply rooted in the imagina-
tion of the politicians, whether they were members of the British or the French “parties” 
(partido francês / partido inglês), that is, whether they principally favored alliance either 
with the continental or the maritime power. In the debates preceding the departure, all 
ministers of state, despite their numerous differences of opinion, agreed on the policy 
that the “best” part of the Portuguese possessions should by no means be put at risk. 
They were all driven by a perspective that Ana Rosa Cloclet da Silva has called the “global 
vision of empire.”24 While sticking to the imperative of holding together the Portuguese 
possessions at all costs, none of them thought of the European part as the basis and 
center of political sovereignty – over the centuries this role had clearly been assigned to 
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and to abandon the peripheries if necessary,26 this certainly holds true for the Portuguese 
empire, as well – except for the peculiarity that the (imagined) center was not the mother 
country, Portugal, but the colony, Brazil. The relocation and renegotiation of oppositions 
and boundaries that characterized the European colonial project in general allowed Eu-
ropeans, in this specific case, to forego Europe itself.27
When João and his courtiers reached their final destination in March 1808, the Portu-
guese hopes and dreams came, at least partly, true: Brazil turned into a safe haven for the 
beleaguered Portuguese monarchy,28 and within a few years the city of Rio de Janeiro 
was turned into a “Tropical Versailles.”29 For the emigrated Prince Regent and the ruling 
elites, the new spatial order with the capital in the tropics worked out so well that, after 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when general peace was achieved and Napoleon ban-
ished, they refused to return to Lisbon (contrary to the promise the monarch had made 
when he left) and preferred to stay in Rio instead. This provoked heated debates on both 
sides of the Atlantic; the location of the sovereign was what the statesman Silvestre Pin-
heiro Ferreira called the decade’s great “question of state.”30 The two main reasons for the 
decision to stay were the fear of the emergence of an independence movement in Brazil 
should the Royal Court be removed (some Spanish colonies had meanwhile declared in-
dependence), and the danger of general political turmoil in Europe (“terrifying” notices 
about expanding liberal movements were numerous).31 All in all, Europe at that time was 
seen as (and surely was) a dangerous place for an absolute (non-constitutional) monarch 
whereas Brazil served as a “fortress of absolutism,” as Maria Odila Silva Dias has put it.32 
Moreover, the ministers of state were convinced of the wisdom of the policy of taking 
advantage of the riches “in which this fortunate and opulent country [Brazil] abounds.”33 
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Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarve.” Technically, Brazil was now a coequal part 
of a European state – or, perhaps, Portugal was part of an American state. Prince Regent 
D. João (VI) continued to rule from Brazil as a legitimate monarch until he was forced 
to return to Portugal in 1821. His son Pedro (I), who stayed in Rio de Janeiro, declared 
independence in September 1822, and it was only then that the empire broke apart.
2. European ideals and the construction of a new capital in the tropics
As Brazilian historian Afonso Carlos Marques dos Santos has pointed out, the transfer 
of the court was not only a geopolitical project. Once put into motion, it also involved a 
“civilizing mission.” According to him, Rio de Janeiro, the new seat of government and 
center of power par excellence, was transformed into a “huge laboratory of civilization.”34 
The metamorphosis from a colonial capital35 into the capital of the empire first of all 
required a new state apparatus that was modeled off of the former European capital: The 
Crown immediately established duplicates of the government institutions still existing in 
Lisbon.36 Due to steady immigration, the population of Rio de Janeiro almost doubled 
from about 60,000 inhabitants in 1808 to about 113,000 inhabitants in 1821,37 to men-
tion just one of the greater structural alterations during the process of the “metropoli-
tanization of the colony.”38 In the following part, it is my intention to demonstrate how 
European ideals and principles came into play in this laboratory. I shall examine some 
of the measures concerning aesthetics and social engineering in a close reading of police 
documents of the time. As part of the analysis, I want to address the following questions: 
What and who was perceived as European? How were European ideals adapted and im-
plemented and when and why did certain ideals and notions change?
Following the court’s arrival and during the following years (from 1808 to 1821), the 
city of Rio de Janeiro became subject to various changes in regard to social and cultural 
organization: in order to project an image of royal power and notions of order, enlighten-
ment and progress, European standards had to be implemented. As many scholars have 
pointed out, one of the most important institutions for the establishment of modern 
statehood in the eighteenth century was the police.39 The same seems to hold true for 
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Rio de Janeiro in 1808 was to establish a Police Intendancy modeled off of the Lisbon 
Police, which in turn had been modeled off of the French policing system.40 The police 
chief (intendente geral da polícia), Paulo Fernandes Vianna (1808–1821), subsequently 
became known as the “chief civilizer” of the urban area as it was he who initiated all 
“civilizing measures” concerning infrastructure, social engineering, and urban develop-
ment.41 Consistent with colonial administrative practice, his office combined legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers. Being one of the closest counselors of Prince Regent João 
and, thus, in a sense representing the authority of the absolute monarch, the police chief 
became one of the most important builders and custodians of the new order in the city. 
Under Vianna’s rule, Rio was reconstructed and made more “glamorous” so it could 
fulfill its role as the new seat of the Royal Court and compete with the capitals of other 
European states and empires.42
One of the police chief ’s first concerns was the aesthetics of the new capital. In 1809, he 
determined that the wooden lattices (or window shutters), a relic of Arab architecture 
that formerly prevailed in Portugal, had to disappear from the residential buildings of the 
center of the city. The “ugly lattices” were seen as gothic, deformed and unhealthy. Ac-
cording to the police chief, they were nothing but evidence of the “lacking civilization of 
the inhabitants.” The respective police decree read that, “having elevated this city to the 
highest hierarchy of court of Brazil,” it was no longer possible to maintain “old customs 
that could be tolerated only when Brazil was reputed to be a colony.” The explicit aim of 
the removal of supposedly colonial attributes was to make Rio de Janeiro “more beauti-
ful in the eyes of strangers.”43 Quite a few inhabitants complained about this measure 
because the window shutters had not been for nothing, but rather had served to protect 
the houses’ interior from the tropical sun. However, the complaints of those who could 
not afford other protective installations (such as “civilized” glass windows) were useless: 
in this specific case, the aesthetics of the new capital seemed to have been more impor-
tant than the well-being of some residents. As the window shutters were symbols of Arab 
colonialism, it is quite evident (even if not explicitly stated) that the signs of “non-civili-
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Some other (attempted) adaptations of European standards were inspired by both aesthetic 
and pragmatic considerations. As the police chief stated in 1811, the streets of Rio had to 
be broader and better paved because “in all countries”, this was a sign of “good police.” 
Broader streets would be advantageous for commerce, as well. From Vianna’s point of view, 
the streets in their current condition were only fit for the “passage of animals,” not for 
proper coach traffic. The police chief was well aware, however, that the proposed measures 
of enlarging the streets would “not yet” please all inhabitants of the city.44 Some of them 
would suffer loss of property, and as some other documents reveal, the residents were 
frequently ordered to help with the construction by providing their own (or their slave’s) 
manpower.45 The expression “not yet” is highly revealing. It underlines Vienna’s assump-
tion that European norms were both superior and would eventually come to be accepted in 
Rio de Janeiro (and Brazil).46 The improvement of the city’s illumination (illuminação da 
Cidade) also was “very important for its vigilance and safety.” By comparing Rio de Janeiro 
with Lisbon, Vianna lamented the scarcity of skilled workers and iron foundries for the 
production of street lamps, a situation that in his opinion would not change in the foresee-
able future.47 The issue of the street lamps serves as an example of the perception, or more 
precisely the construction of deficiency: the absence of iron street lamps was repeatedly in-
dicated as a problem, yet no attempt was made to search for alternatives. The illumination 
of the city remained poor in the eyes of Vianna until at least 1819.48 
Besides improving the infrastructure, safety and security and guaranteeing the aesthetics, 
one of the most important concerns of the government was to increase immigration to 
Brazil. In order to extract the riches of the “vast continent” of Brazil and to increase the 
utility of the soil, there had to be more people. Therefore, the monarch issued a decree 
that allowed “all foreigners regardless of their religion” to settle down in Brazil on equal 
terms as Portuguese vassals.49 In reality, the immigration policy was not as liberal. Rather, 
Paulo Fernandes Vianna pursued the goal of “whitening and ennobling” the population 
of Brazil. Therefore, he tried to attract people from Portugal and the Azores, offering fa-
vorable conditions in Brazil by providing new settlers with land, tools, financial support 
(subsidies for the first two years were granted by the government) and the payment for the 















Europe in the Tropics? The Transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court to Brazil (1807/08) | 41
laborers from Europe to improve agriculture and advance the manufacturing industry.51 
What at that time was called “good police” (boa polícia), was directly linked to the new 
status of Brazil: because the Monarch now resided in Brazil, the police chief wrote in 1810, 
the country urgently needed “better police” and “more perfect” agriculture. By attracting 
“unfortunate” peasants from Europe and offering them “more favorable” livelihoods in 
the New World, the police chief sought to make a “useful” deal and serve the monarch 
in “all parts” of the Empire.52 As becomes evident in quite a few sources, it was Vianna’s 
explicit plan to “improve” the agriculture and to “increase the white population” of the 
provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo.53 The “great utility” (maior 
utilidade) particularly ascribed to the Azorean immigrants is frequently mentioned in the 
police documents.54 Remarkably, during these years there is no evidence of any attempt 
by the authorities to make use of the expertise of Brazilian natives. In other cases, they 
did consult indigenous people and used their knowledge about the environment and the 
jungle, for instance when it came to hunting runaway slaves.55 Concerning farming mat-
ters, however, Portuguese authorities acted as if the soil in Europe was similar to the soil in 
the tropics and as if only European experts were able to improve Brazilian agriculture. In 
other words, the immigration policy was obviously driven by the belief of the superiority 
of European agriculture.
In culture and especially higher education, Europe also continued to serve as the ex-
ample. Despite the fact that the monarch now resided in Brazil, there was no effort to 
establish a university. In contrast to the Spanish possessions, and due to the educational 
policy of the Portuguese Crown that sought to centralize the production of knowledge, 
no university existed in Brazil during the entire colonial period.56 Coimbra in Portugal 
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mained peripheral in this respect. Sons of wealthy families still had to cross the Atlantic 
to pursue higher education.57 As it was the intent of the police chief to also increase the 
number of educated persons in Brazil, he supported parents who could not pay for the 
passage of their children. In September 1819, he asked the government to comply with a 
letter of request by a mother who could not afford her son’s journey and stay in Coimbra. 
According to Vianna, who assured the government that he had gathered “all available 
information” about him, the boy Jozé Vilela de Barros showed “good behavior” and was 
thus worth the patronage of the Crown. In the police chief ’s eyes, the state could profit 
from “talents like him” after his return to Brazil.58 Here, too, the orientation of the ruling 
elites in Rio de Janeiro towards European intellectual standards in the construction of 
Brazilian society is evident.
However obvious the attempts of “Europeanizing” and “whitening” Brazilian society 
might have been – not all Europeans were welcome. While the war against Napoleon 
raged in Europe, the French were persecuted for being qua nationality “subversive ele-
ments” and for fostering revolution in Brazil. The police chief ’s explicit plan, as he stated 
in 1811, was to “purge” the Brazilian soil of the “French race,” which he viewed as “very 
dangerous.”59 The French may have been European, but for the time being they could 
not be part of the process of Brazilian civilization for political reasons. The situation radi-
cally changed after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when peace was restored in Europe. 
The authorities initiated what became known as the “French Cultural Mission”; more 
than a dozen French artisans and artists were to make Rio still “more glamorous” and to 
bring “high culture” to the former colony. Men, such as the painter Jean Baptiste Debret 
and the architect Auguste Montigny, came to the new capital and provided the Crown 
with a vision of civilization, progress, and order inspired by French neoclassicism.60 Jef-
frey Needell has explained the “French Cultural Mission” with the “linkage between state 
and culture” assumed by the monarch and his government; for the Portuguese or “Brazil-
ian” elites, the French culture was “simply the most advanced example of a civilization 
they considered universal.”61 This reveals an important pattern in the construction of 
the new capital: Europeanizing measures were by no means inflexible imperatives but 
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– changes. It is possible to state that the conception of “Europeanness” could, and did, 
drastically alter from one moment to another, for instance by first rejecting and then 
including French culture as part of “Europeanness.”
The attempt to make the city of Rio de Janeiro “more glamorous” included both striv-
ing for an “adequate” racial composition of Brazilian society and also attempting to 
impose the “right” behavior on the people within the urban area. A major problem the 
police chief faced from the beginning was the “homens vadios,” the vagabonds in the 
streets of Rio, that is, men moving in public space without an apparent destination. A 
“vadio” was defined as a man without master, occupation, or home.62 The explicit goal 
of the police, as Vianna described it in 1809, was to “eliminate the vagabonds” (sendo dos 
cuidados da Polícia expurgar os vadios).63 These people were perceived as a threat because 
they interfered with the “good order” and “glamour” of Rio de Janeiro. The undirected, 
uncontrolled movement was to be stopped especially in the capital city, which explicitly 
served as a role model for the rest of the territory. Of course, vagabonds had been perse-
cuted in Brazil before the arrival of the monarch in 1808, and, to be sure, the negative 
attitude towards vagrants had been a general Western European phenomenon since the 
fifteenth century.64 In Portugal, for instance, vagrancy was considered contrary to public 
well-being and described as a crime in the “orders of the kingdom” in the eighteenth 
century.65 This notion was also transferred to the Portuguese colonies. From the day the 
monarch stepped onto the city’s soil, the persecution became much more severe, and the 
reason was clear: the capital of an empire could not afford vagabonds in its streets, for 
they smudged the fame not only of the city but also of the empire. Thus, one can state 
that the establishment of the Court in the New World and the transformation of Rio 
from a peripheral, colonial town into a metropolis and center of politics coincided with 
a more negative attitude towards movement of individuals in urban space in general, and 
the so-called vagabonds in particular.
The paradoxical situation in Brazil was that the authorities could not live with the vaga-
bonds, but they could not live without them either. Their work force was needed to pro-
tect and fortify the Brazilian borders against invaders coming from Spanish dominions. 
So-called “recruitment” became a common practice. It meant capturing vagabonds in 
the streets of Rio, deporting them and compelling them into military service. In 1811, 
the minister of state, Conde de Linhares, instructed the police to capture 400 vagabonds 
because the troops in the Extreme South of Brazil needed reinforcement to secure (and 
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a native of Rio de Janeiro (but had studied in Coimbra, Portugal), suggested that the 
minister of state, who was a native of Portugal, had very limited knowledge of the social 
structure of the new capital. In one night, he respectfully reported that 132 men actually 
had been captured, but only 15 of them turned out to be “real” vagabonds and thus fit 
for recruitment – all the others were men who had strolled the streets of the city without 
a license (licença), but who eventually could prove they had a legitimate occupation.66 
This incident shows the paradox in the enforcement of European norms and laws: at 
times they were enforced not for the sake of “civilization” but because the state was 
actually in need of people who infringed these rules, as trespassers could be forced into 
military service. 
The best example of the limits of the project of constructing a European capital is per-
haps the handling of African slavery. The most striking difference between the old court 
in Lisbon and the new one in Rio was the fact that half of the population of the new 
court consisted of enslaved persons. Yet, slavery since the eighteenth century was an 
exclusively colonial practice, that is, it actually meant the opposite of “Europeanness” 
or “civilization.” It was a practice associated with backwardness, and in Portugal itself, 
slavery had been abolished as early as 1761. If making Rio de Janeiro into a metropoli-
tan court meant breaking with a colonial past, then the use of slave labor would have 
to be forgone.67 Due to the fact that the whole economic and social system in Brazil 
was dependent on slavery, however, there was no way to abolish this institution without 
destroying the whole monarchy. The presence of African slaves in Brazil remained a fact 
until 1888.68 Thus, making the new, metropolitan city of Rio also required the toler-
ance of old, unmetropolitan and certainly non-European practices. As Kirsten Schultz has 
argued, the only way of dealing with this contradiction was to “metropolitanize” slavery. 
According to her, this task was most important for the maintenance of the Ancien Régime 
in the tropics.69 The police intendant and other royal officials believed that slavery could 
become courtly and fashionable if the slaves’ presence in the city was carefully control-
led.70 Besides eliminating “capoeira-rounds” (rodas de capoeira), an Afro-Brazilian art 
form which combines martial arts, music and dance71 and extinguishing the quilombos 
(settlements of freed slaves and fugitives that were considered a “danger” to “public tran-
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ity in the streets as well as social segregation. Dom João’s government no longer tolerated 
gatherings at public squares, and police persecution eliminated many African dances in 
the public space.73 Especially during symbolically charged religious feast days and cer-
emonies crucial to the monarchy and state (such as court mourning), it was imperative 
that the slaves did not practice capoeira or commit other “disorders” (desordens).74 As 
many of the sources reveal, it was an intensification of colonialism and an intensification 
of “othering” that made the “new city” of Rio de Janeiro imperial in nature.75 It is in 
the very paradoxical attitude towards slavery that the limits of the Europeanization and 
civilizing mission become most evident.
3. Conclusions
Since the sixteenth century, respective Portuguese rulers, politicians, and clerics con-
sidered the European part of the Portuguese Empire weak and insufficient. However, 
the project of the creation of a “powerful empire” in Brazil was by no means linked to 
striving after a completely different, “non-European” empire. Rather, the transfer of the 
Royal Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807/1808 also meant the transfer of the 
concepts of “good order” and “good government” from the Old to the New World. Yet, 
“Europe” or “Europeanness” were categories hardly ever used by Portuguese authorities. 
During the construction of the new capital, they rather referred to overarching categories 
such as “civilization” or to specific European sub-groups such as “Portuguese,” “Azorian” 
or “French.” Nevertheless, one can easily detect European principles in the process of 
“civilizing” the Brazilian society, which were, however, by no means implemented en 
bloc, but in very different ways and for different reasons.
The adaptation of some of these principles seems to have occurred as a “natural” or 
“logical” consequence of the transfer; that is, they seem to have been adapted almost 
unconsciously. The measures undertaken concerning aesthetics and security, for instance, 
aimed to make Rio de Janeiro as “civilized” as any European capital. The police chief 
used European societies and cultures as role models. The streets had to be broadened 
because this was a sign for “good police” in “all countries” (on the European continent); 
the “ugly” lattices had to be removed because they befitted only a colony (not a mother 
country); more street lamps needed to be established because Lisbon had plenty; and 
society and agriculture needed to be improved by white European settlers because only 
they were considered apt to till a field. These measures were hardly ever questioned, but 
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Some other principles and measures were not unconsciously adapted, but restricted by 
and actively designed for the local political, social and economic needs and thus subject 
to changes. Whereas the “French Race” was considered “dangerous” as long as the war 
against Napoleon was going on in Europe, the image of the French changed from one 
day to the next after the Congress of Vienna. In other words, who was considered an 
ideal European and what was conceived as the European ideal heavily depended on 
(political) circumstances. In some cases, the implementation of (more rigid) European 
standards and rules did not only, or not even primarily, serve the higher aspiration to 
“civilization” but above all the economic interests of the state: after all, trespassers could 
be used for military or public service. Finally, the institution of slavery brought to light 
the very paradox of civilization and Europeanization. Due to the fact that the Brazilian 
society and economy was “compromised” by slavery76, the only expedient the Portuguese 
authorities saw just was the intensification of old colonial practices.
In fact, there hardly was a “possible Europe” to be found or founded in the tropics. At 
least in the eyes of the Portuguese who remained in Portugal, Brazil was not and could 
never be European. The Europeanization of the colony, seen from the European perspec-
tive, remained an illusion. When the liberal revolution broke out in Portugal in August 
1820, members of the Portuguese elites demanded that the king return to the “legiti-
mate” metropolis of the Portuguese Empire, that is the European “cradle of the Monar-
chy.” In this context, Manoel Fernandes Thomaz, one of the leading Portuguese liberals, 
called Brazil a “land of monkeys, bananas and of small negroes caught on the shores of 
Africa” (terra de macacos, de negrinhos apanhados na costa da Africa, e de bananas)77. Por-
tuguese journalists, now making full use of the new liberty of the press, repeatedly wrote 
about Brazil as the “land of Negroes, mulattos, goats and mestizos.” Obviously, Europe-
ans referred to the ethnic diversity of Brazil as the most important feature and at the same 
time as the most evident proof of the lack of civilization.78 In fact, the Portuguese king 
complied with the demand and returned to Lisbon in 1821. The Portuguese historian, 
Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro, found that all the members of the high nobility that had ac-
companied the monarch to Brazil returned en bloc as well and that the amalgamation of 
Brazilian and Portuguese aristocracy during the stay of the Court in Brazil was virtually 
nul.79 If after 1808 Brazil had been equated with the “good order” of absolutism and Eu-
rope with revolutionary changes and liberalism, the monarch and large parts of the elites 
in 1821 were ready to face the changes and to opt for Europe all the same. Ultimately, it 
seems “original” European roots mattered to them.
	 J.	L.	Ribeiro	Fragoso	and	M.	Florentino,	O	arcaísmo	como	projeto.	Mercado	Atlântico,	Sociedade	Agrária	e	Elite	
Mercantil	no	Rio	de	Janeiro	(90–840),	Rio	de	Janeiro	993,	p.	88;	E.	Viotti	da	Costa,	Political	Emancipation	of	
Brazil,	A.	J.	R.	Russell-Wood	(ed.),	From	Colony	to	Nation.	Essays	on	the	Independence	of	Brazil,	Baltimore	and	
London	95,	pp.	43-88,	p.	5.
	 Cf.	L.	Bethell,	The	independence	of	Brazil,	in:	Idem,	The	independence	of	Latin	America,	Cambridge	et	al.	98,	
pp.	55-94,	p.	8.
8	 I.	Lustosa,	Insultos	impressos.	A	guerra	dos	jornalistas	na	Independência	(82–823),	São	Paulo	2000,	p.	40.
9	 N.	G.	Monteiro,	Elites	e	Poder.	Entre	o	Antigo	Regime	e	o	Liberalismo,	Lisbon	2003.
